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TA91 (Müller)

 

Commentary 15

 

 

 

INTERSUBJECTIVE EVENTS

by Adhanom Andemicael

9 August 2007, posted 11 August 2007

 

 

 

[George Berzins; <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/levinas/message/297>]

As explained in Cohen's translation of Time and the Other, according to Levinas, the other person encountered face-to-face is not the subject's contemporary, they do not meet one another 'at the same time.' The time of the Other and my time, or the times of mineness, ecstatic temporalities, do not occur at the same time. The time of the Other disrupts or interrupts the self's own temporality.

 

[Adhanom Andemicael]

"Intersubjectivity" requires the existence of an "objective present." In the absence of an "objective present," there can be no intersubjective events.

 

I am not familiar with the work of Emmanuel Levinas. However, yesterday I read a short explanation of "synchronicity" and "diachronicity" at:

<http://home.wxs.nl/~brouw724/Levinas.html>. (1)

 

***

 

Below, I present my analysis of Levinas' philosophy:

 

***

 

A few preliminary points:

 

-- R is a reality consisting of two minds, M1 and M2.(2)

-- M1 experiences its own (subjective) time S1.

-- M2 experiences its own (subjective) time S2.

 

Let us consider the following three statements:

 

A: Intersubjective events occur in R.

B: S1 and S2 occur independently of each other.

C: M1 and M2 exist within a common "objective present."

 

***

 

Levinas would probably claim that statement A is true. (He makes reference to "face-to-face" encounters between the self and the Other [i.e., between M1 and M2].)

 

I believe Levinas would also claim that statement B is true. (In his philosophy, the Other exists outside of the self's synchronic time.)

 

Levinas seems to believe that statements A and B are both true.(3) Note, however, logically, A and B cannot both be true.

 

Here is the reason why:

 

If A is true, C is true. However, if B is true, C is false.  If A is true and B is true, C is both true *and* false.  We know that C cannot be both true and false.  Therefore, we know that A and B cannot both be true.

 

***

 

I suggest the following:

 

Intersubjective events do *not* occur in R.

S1 and S2 occur independently of each other.

M1 and M2 do *not * exist within a common "objective present."

 

(Please see <http://www.KJF.ca/91-C12AND.htm> and "PART IV" of "Target Article 61" <http://www.kjf.ca/61-TAAND.htm>.)

 

 

NOTES

 

1. The work of Emmanuel Levinas is new to me. I hope I have not misunderstood his philosophical position.

 

2. In the example above, I describe a reality that has just two minds.  However, we can consider a reality that has any number of minds.

 

3. I suggest that there are philosophers who believe that statements A and B are both true.

 

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Target Article 61

http://www.kjf.ca/61-TAAND.htm

http://www.kjf.ca/

 

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Adhanom Andemicael

     e-mail <Andemicael (at) worldnet.att.net

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