KARL JASPERS FORUM
TA
102 (Vimal)
Commentary
9
"THE
NATURE OF TIME"
by Adhanom Andemicael
9 December 2009, posted 12 December
2009
http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/cgi-bin/wa?A1=ind0911&L=chora#64
<1>[Adhanom Andemicael]
In
order for an entity to exist concretely, the entity must exist at the "present
moment of time." Entities that exist in the past or the future do not exist
concretely.
<2>
Let
us consider the following two statements:
A)
There exists an objective, three-dimensional world.
B)
There exists an objective present moment of time.
<3>
In
order for statement A to be true, statement B must be
true.
<4>
Is
statement B true? Does there exist an objective present
moment of time?
<5>
We
know that the mind experiences its own *subjective* present (i.e., its
own *phenomenal* present). It is clear, therefore, that there exists a
*subjective* present moment of time. However, it is not at all clear that
there exists an *objective* present (i.e., a present that exists
independently of the mind).
<6>[Danny Frederick]
Hi
Adhanom,
There
is an ambiguity in your (B). It is a familiar one. What does the 'present
moment' mean? Is it an indexical that picks out a particular time that we could
date? Or is it a general property that applies to any moment at the time that it
is present? The existence of an objective extended temporal dimension implies
your (B) in the first case but not in the second. To put it another way, if time is
objective (as an extended dimension) then any particular point in time (or
minimally extended temporal span) is objective; therefore the present moment
(let's say noon on 24 November 2009) is objective. But someone could admit
this even if he denies that there is any such thing as temporal presence (the
now).
<7>[Adhanom Andemicael]
One
way of conceiving of time is as follows:
There
is an "objective present." This present moves (somehow) from one date to the
next (e.g., from Jan. 1, 2000 to Jan. 2, 2000). When the present arrives at Jan.
1, Jan. 1 comes into existence. When the present arrives at Jan. 2, Jan. 2 comes
into existence. (As soon as the present moves from Jan. 1 to Jan. 2, Jan. 1
ceases to exist.)
<8>
In
this conception, it is not clear what the "objective present" actually
*is*. Whatever the present is, it is something that is capable of
*moving* from one date to the next.
<9>
If
this moving, objective present does not exist, dates (e.g., Jan. 1, Jan. 2,
etc.) cannot exist. (They cannot exist because they can never posses the
property of being present.)
***
<10>
In
my messages, I make reference to the "objective present" and the "objective
present moment of time." Please note that I'm referring to the moving "objective
present" described above.
***
<11>[Danny Frederick]
To
put it another way, if time is objective (as an extended dimension) then any
particular point in time (or minimally extended temporal span) is objective;
therefore the present moment (let's say noon on 24 November 2009) is
objective.
<12>[Adhanom Andemicael]
"12:00
PM, 24 November 2009" is a "location in time." (Note however that the "objective
present" is *not* a "location in time.")
<13>[Adhanom Andemicael]
The
"objective present" *moves* from one "location in time" to
another. However, a
"location in time" remains fixed at a particular "location in
time."
***
<14>[Danny Frederick]
I
think your (A) was badly formulated, which is why I have not referred to it. Did
you mean to say 'four-dimensional world'?
<15>[Adhanom Andemicael]
No.
Here is statement (A) again:
"A)
There exists an objective, three-dimensional
world."
***
<16>[Adhanom Andemicael]
The
following is a slightly altered version of the message I posted on Nov. 23. I
use the term "objective present" in this version. Please note that I'm referring
to the moving "objective present" described above:
***
<17>
In
order for an entity to exist concretely, the entity must exist at the present.
Entities that exist in the past or the future do not exist concretely. (Past and
future entities are less real than present entities.)
<18>
Let
us consider the following two statements:
A)
There exists an objective, three-dimensional world. B) There exists an objective
present.
<19>
In
order for statement A to be true, statement B must be true.
<20>
Is
statement B true? Does there exist an objective
present?
<21>
We
know that the mind experiences its own *subjective* present i.e.,
its own *phenomenal* present). It is clear, therefore, that there exists
a *subjective* present. However, it is not at all clear that there exists
an *objective* present (i.e., a present that exists independently of the
mind).
***
<22>[Adhanom Andemicael]
I
discuss subjective time flow in my paper "Temporal
Passage":
http://home.att.net/~Andemicael/intro.html
***
<23>[Danny Frederick]
So
someone can accept your (A), that there exists an objective three-dimensional
world, while denying your (B), that there exists an objective present (in your
sense of 'objective present'). Someone who did that would be denying that
anything exists concretely in your sense; but he would still accept that there
are objective existents (past, present and future). Basically, he would say
there is a B-series but no A-series (have I recalled those terms correctly?); he
would say that there is temporal order but no temporal passage. On this view
tenses would be indexical expressions that could be eliminated without loss by
means of 'eternal sentences.'
<24>[Adhanom Andemicael]
Please
note that in statement A, I'm talking about a *concrete*, objective,
three-dimensional world. (I'm sorry I wasn't clear about
this.)
<25>
In
my last posting, I wrote:
"Let
us consider the following two statements:
A)
There exists an objective, three-dimensional world.
B)
There exists an objective present.
<26>
In
order for statement A to be true, statement B must be
true."
<27>
However,
I should have written:
"Let
us consider the following two statements:
A)
There exists a concrete, objective, three-dimensional
world.
B)
There exists an objective present.
<28>
In
order for statement A to be true, statement B must be
true."
***
<29>[Adhanom Andemicael]
If
there is no "objective present," there can be no concrete, objective
world.
<30>
Many
B-theorists claim that there is no "objective present." Yet they maintain that
there is a concrete, objective world.
***
<31>[Danny Frederick]
So
someone can accept your (A), that there exists an objective three-dimensional
world, while denying your (B), that there exists an objective present (in your
sense of 'objective present'). Someone who did that would be denying that
anything exists concretely in your sense; but he would still accept that there
are objective existents (past, present and future). Basically, he would say
there is a B-series but no A-series (have I recalled those terms correctly?); he
would say that there is temporal order but no temporal passage. On this view
tenses would be indexical expressions that could be eliminated without loss by
means of 'eternal sentences.'
<32>[Adhanom Andemicael]
Okay.
***
<33>[Adhanom Andemicael]
Dates
that lack the property of being present are unreal. B-series dates lack the property of
being present. Dates in this series are therefore unreal.
(Note:
B-theorists claim that dates in the B-series are real.)
http://home.att.net/~Andemicael/intro.html
Target
Article 61
http://www.kjf.ca/61-TAAND.htm
------------------------------------------------
Adhanom
Andemicael
e-mail <Andemicael (at) att.net
>